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THE NINTH CIRCUIT EXPANDS THE 10b-5 NET
TO CATCH A COLUMNIST-
ZWEIG V. HEARST CORPORATION
In a recent decision, Zweig v. Hearst Corporation,' the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit found that a financial columnist may be liable for dam-
ages under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 2 and its
supplemental rule 10b-5. 3  The columnist's liability could be based upon
failure to disclose "scalper" 4 status in a corporation's stock recommended in
his daily financial column. 5
By contemplating liability in a private cause of action for damages against
the defendant columnist, the court expanded the remedies available to the
investing public against the practice of stock scalping. 6 The plaintiffs in
1. 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
2. The section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
3. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978) pro-
vides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice t o defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
4. "Scalping" has been defined as "the purchase of securities by a person in a position to
influence others by his recommendation or favorable commentary on that security, the recom-
mendation of that security to investors, and the sale of that security after capital appreciation."
Peskind, Regulation of the Financial Press: A New Dimension to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
14 ST. Louis U. L.J. 80, 81 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Peskindi. This term was used by the
Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181 (1963),
where the Court found such activities to be fraudulent when practiced by an investment ad-
visor.
5. The plaintiffs actually alleged that three omissions of material fact provided the basis for
imposing liability. 594 F.2d at 1265. See note 18 and accompanying text infra.
6. The defendant, Campbell, was previously subject to an injunctive action by the SEC.
SEC v. Campbell, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,580, at 92,703 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (summary of
complaint).
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Zweig, however, were parties to a merger agreement that predated the col-
umn by over three months.7 As a result, the decision was in favor of per-
sons who, unlike the column's readers, could not have been influenced by
the laudatory nature of the column in making their investment decision. 8
The purpose of this Note is to examine the Zweig decision in light of the
Supreme Court's current attempts to retract the scope of liability under
rule 10b-5. 9 Given the Supreme Court's stance, the Ninth Circuit's liberal
fashioning of the elements of the 10b-5 cause of action and its unexplained
departure from its own law and that of the other circuits to justify the exten-
sion of liability to these plaintiffs is subject to criticism.
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Alex N. Campbell, a financial columnist for the Los Angeles Herald
Examiner, wrote a column recommending the purchase of stock of American
Systems, Inc. (ASI). 1o Two days prior to the column's appearance,
Campbell purchased 5000 shares of ASI stock. 11 The day after the column,
Campbell sold 2,000 of his 5,000 shares. 12
Each plaintiff in this action owned one third of the shares of Reading
Guidance Center, Inc. (RGC), 13 a company that was to merge into ASI
The practice of scalping stock has been pinpointed as undesirable in the securities market
for over fifteen years. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963);
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). This report documents the
scalping activities of an editor of Time magazine who purchased stock in a corporation prior to
publication of a favorable article about the company in the magazine's business section. The
editor purchased a block of shares prior to assigning a writer to prepare the article. The price of
the stock rose dramatically (the editor paid from 6 1/8 to 6 3/4 for his stock and sold some of the
shares after the column's appearance for 11 5/8). Over half the customers who responded to a
questionnaire about their motives for purchasing the stock stated that either news of the im-
pending article or the article itself prompted their decision to invest. Id. at 72-76. See generally
Peskind, supra note 4.
7. 594 F.2d at 1265.
8. Id. at 1270.
9. See notes 47-56 and accompanying text infra.
10. 594 F.2d at 1264-65. Campbell's column contained such laudatory remarks as the follow-
ing: "American Systems Inc. (over-the-counter $3 5/8) is an interesting company which should
appeal to the speculative minded investor." Appellant's Reply Brief at 3-4.
11. 594 F.2d at 1264. Campbell's column appeared in the Herald-Examiner on June 4,
1969. On June 2, Campbell purchased the ASI stock for $2.00 per share directly from the
company while the market bid price was $3 5/8 per share. Id. at 1264-65. The court alluded to
the possibility that Campbell's receipt of the stock at a "bargain price" could have constituted a
violation of § 17(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (1976), prohibit-
ing the receipt of "consideration" in exchange for corporate publicity. The court did not pursue
the point since the plaintiffs did not present the issue. Id. at 1264 n.5.
12. 594 F.2d at 1265. Campbell sold for $5.00 per share, thereby recouping the original
investment of $10,000 in the ASI stock while holding the balance of the shares for "future
profits". Id.
13. Id.
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under a plan of reorganization entered into in February, 1969.14 The clos-
ing date for the merger was June 10, 1969, when ASI would transfer to the
RGC shareholders stock with a market value of $1,800,000. The market
value, and therefore the number of shares, would be determined by the
average closing bid for the ASI stock on the five days preceding the closing
date. 15 In effect, the plaintiffs and their company relied on the free market
to determine the ultimate number of shares to be received in the transac-
tion.
Campbell's column appeared six days prior to the closing date for the
merger and the price of ASI stock rose dramatically. 16 As a result of this
price rise, the number of shares the plaintiffs received on the closing date of
the merger was diluted. 17 Plaintiffs brought suit under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5, alleging that Campbell's failure to apprise readers of his activities
misrepresented the objectivity of the column, 18 causing inflation of the stock
price and resulting in their loss of a greater percentage interest of ASI in the
merger transaction. 19 The district court found that Campbell owed no duty
to disclose his status as a shareholder in the ASI corporation. The court
dismissed the complaint, finding that Campbell's honest report of the infor-
mation provided him by the officers of ASI fulfilled his duty not to make any
intentional misrepresentations of material fact. 20
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The plaintiffs presented the opinion of an expert witness who stated that the rise in
the stock price was due to the publication of Campbell's column, given the "thin float" of the
ASI stock (500,000 shares outstanding). The closing bid price between June 3 and June 9 was
$4.35 per share. The expert claimed that the stock would not have risen above the $3.25 market
price without the column's publication. Id. at 1265 & n.6. The plaintiffs attributed the marked
increase in the number of individual investors who were buying the stock compared to brokers
and investment companies to the column's appearance. In addition, the current information
about ASI was less than positive. The company never earned a profit and just repudiated a
contract with its sole distributor for its portable telephone. Appellant's Opening Brief at 28.
17. 594 F.2d at 1270. The merger agreement stated that the minimum price for the ASI
stock would be $3.33 per share and therefore 540,540 or 51.9% would be the maximum number
of shares issued to RGC. Id. at n. 15. Since the price rose to $4.35 per share, RGC only re-
ceived 413,793 shares or 45.3% of the merged corporation. Id. at 1270.
18. The plaintiffs alleged that three omissions of material fact provided the basis for impos-
ing liability: (1) that the defendant invested in the subject stock at a discount price two days
before his column was to be published, and intended to sell it on the short-swing rise in price;
(2) that he made a practice of "scalping" the stocks of companies he wrote about by buying their
stock shortly before his columns were published and then selling the stock at a profit after the
column caused a jump in the market price; and (3) that his favorable columns were often re-
printed as advertisements for the companies in a financial journal in which the defendant had an
interest. Id. at 1265.
19. See notes 16, 17, and accompanying text supra.
20. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 407 F. Supp. 763, 765-66 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
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THE LAW OF RULE 10B-5
The appellate court's holding that a financial columnist has a duty to dis-
close stock ownership of companies recommended in his or her newspaper
column is an expansion of liability under the disclosure provisions to yet
another member of the financial community. Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
counteract a variety of fraudulent activities 2 1 practiced by a diverse group of
market participants. 22 The number of broad purposes and philosophies
underlying the Securities Acts 2 3 have often given the courts justification for
their expansive interpretation of rule 10b,5 while applying its remedies to a
host of fraudulent situations.
Until some of its recent decisions, 24 the Supreme Court approved the
liberal interpretation and expansive application of rule 10b-5. In SEC v. Na-
tional Securities, Inc., 25 the Court acknowledged "[t]he broad antifraud
purpose" 2 6 of rule 10b-5 and characterized its inquiry as determining
whether the "alleged conduct is the type of fraudulent behavior which was
meant to be forbidden" 27 by the rule. This flexible construction suggested
21. The Court in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11 n.7
(1971) quoting A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397.(2d Cir. 1967) stated:
We believe that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involves
a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of deception. Novel or
atypical methods should not provide immunity from the securities laws.
22. The language of both § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 provide liability for violative conduct by
any person". See notes 2 & 3 supra. Section 3(a)(9) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9)
(1976), broadly defines "person" to mean: "a natural person, company, government, or political
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government." Despite the broad language, a
number of courts have construed § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 as principally directed against the
activities of corporate insiders. "One of the primary purposes of the Securities Exchange Act
... was to outlaw the use of inside information by corporate officers and principal stockholders
for their own financial advantage to the detriment of uninformed public security holders."
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951). See also Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974); Radiation Dynamics,
Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972). The Commission and the courts, h'gw-
ever, have long recognized that the application of rule 10b-5 extends beyond corporate insiders.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (tippees), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (broker-dealers). See 3 L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1445 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
23. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) ("design of the statute is to protect
investors"); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d at 236-40 (equal
access to information, "to secure fair dealing", prevents inequitable and unfair practices and
insures fairness); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th Cir.) (equalization
of bargaining position), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d at 858 (dominant congressional purpose is to promote free markets).
24. Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
25. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
26. Id. at 467.
27. Id.
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that any conduct could be actionable under rule 10b-5 if it served the anti-
fraud design of the statute. Of course, the expansive interpretation in the
circuits 28 was also facilitated by the high court's similar rulings in its pre-
1975 decisions. 29
The Court's opinion in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States 3o is charac-
teristic of this period. Although proof of reliance was traditionally required
in a private cause of action, 31 the Supreme Court insisted that the rule was
to be liberally and flexibly construed 32 and held that in a nondisclosure case,
"positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery." 33
The proliferation of 10b-5 cases is the result of the private cause of action
for damages implied from the provisions of the rule. 34 This private right of
action was recognized as a necessary and effective means of enforcing the
rule 35 since it gave individual investors motivation for policing the securities
markets, thereby augmenting the resources of the Securities Exchange
Commission. 36 Because the private cause of action was grounded in tort
principles, 37 elements of the common law action for fraud have provided the
framework for determining 10b-5 violations.
38
Naturally, the restraints on 10b-5 liability result from a failure to prove all
the requisite elements of the private cause of action. The circuits, however,
have been flexible in assessing the presence of the traditional elements prior
28. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974) (flexible duty under rule
10b-5); Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff need
not be a purchaser or a seller), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); City Nat'l Bank v. Vander-
boom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.) (negligent conduct is actionable), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970).
29. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
30. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
31. See notes 153-159 and accompanying text infra.
32. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 153.
33. Id.
34. The first case to imply a private right of action based upon a violation of rule 10b-5 was
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Kardon court based its
imposition of civil liability upon its reading of the Restatement of Torts § 286, holding an actor
liable for a violation of a legislative enactment if the intent of the act is to protect an interest of
another and the interest invaded is one the enactment is intended to protect. 69 F. Supp. at
513. The Supreme Court finally recognized the implied right of action for damages in Superin-
tendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. at 13 n.9.
35. Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974) (implementation of rule
10b-5 is dependent on private enforcement); James v. Gerber Products Co., 483 F.2d 944, 950
(6th Cir. 1973) (should encourage private enforcement to reduce incidence of fraud); Fratt v.
Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953) (nothing "would more certainly tend to deter
fraudulent practices" than a private right of action).
36. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache &
Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
37. See note 34 supra.
38. See Loss, supra note 22, at 1430-44; Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions
Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 585 (1975); Comment, Negligent Misrepresenta-
tions Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 824, 832 (1965).
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to awarding damages. 39 In the past, the required elements of a 10b-5 cause
of action were: standing to sue, 40 privity, 4 causation, 42 reliance, 43 material-
ity, 44 and scienter. 45 Absent Supreme Court guidance on the necessity for
39. See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1970). Professor Loss states that
the courts have repeatedly said the fraud provisions in the SEC acts ... are not limited to
circumstances which would give rise to a common law action for deceit." Loss, supra note 22,
at 1435. See also Vanderboom v. Sexton, 294 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Ark. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Note, The Nature and
Scope of the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 24 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 363, 367 (1973) (common law fraud is a "starting point from which the courts can
develop a federal common law that will promote the broad policy goals of 10b-5").
40. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See notes 54-56 and
accompanying text infra.
41. The necessity for privity of contract as a prerequisite to lob-5 recovery was first articu-
lated in Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951),
aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). This requirement that plaintiff buy from or sell
to the defendant has now been rejected almost overwhelmingly. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d at 238-39; Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464
F.2d 339, 342-43 n.6 (9th Cir. 1972); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d at 805 n.12. But see Frid-
rich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976) (decision suggests that privity is still essential to
impose liability), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
42. It is universally required that plaintiff show causation of his injury. See, e.g., Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 154; Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggan, 513 F.2d 234, 239
(2d Cir. 1975); Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1359 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1007 (1975).
43. The reliance requirement may no longer exist, at least in nondisclosure cases. See Af-
filiated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 153-54. But one court has insisted that the
plaintiff show reliance in a nondisclosure case, despite the Affiliated Ute decision. Financial
Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 874 (1973). See also Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880,
883-85 (5th Cir. 1973) (limited Affiliated Ute in an omission case).
Some cases have explicitly held that Affiliated Ute does not apply to misrepresentation cases.
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040 (8th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
Other decisions have held that the Affiliated Ute approach should apply to misrepresentations
directed to a large class. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975) (reliance can be
inferred from proof of materiality in either misrepresentation or omission case). See also Herbst
v. Int'l Tel. & Tel., 495 F.2d 1308, 1315 (2d Cir. 1974); Swanson v. American Consumers
Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 516, 520-21 (7th Cir. 1973). For a discussion of the post-Affiliated Ute
reliance requirements, see Campbell, Elements of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: Scienter, Re-
liance, and Plaintiff's Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 S.C. L. REv. 653, 674-685 (1975);
Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REV.
584 (1975).
44. Clause 2 of the rule proscribes misrepresentations or omissions of material facts. See
note 3 supra. See also, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 152-54; Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 911. Therefore, the materiality requirement precludes liability for
trivial representations. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 447 (1976);
Lyman v. Standard Brands, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 794, 797 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Puma v. Marriott, 363
F. Supp. 750, 757 (D. Del. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1974); note 49 infra.
45. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See notes 51-53 and accompanying
text infra.
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and the parameters of a given element, the circuit courts often have reached
disparate conclusions. 46
Recent Supreme Court decisions, adopting conservative approaches to the
elements of scienter, 4 7 standing to sue, 48 and materiality, 4 9 have provided
definitive statements on the necessity of proving each of these elements. In
addition, these decisions are recognized as limiting the overall scope of lia-
bility under rule 10b-5. 50 The best example of Supreme Court retraction
of rule 10b-5 liability is the decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 51 By
holding that scienter, an intent to deceive, be proven in a private 10b-5
action, 52 the Court precluded liability for misconduct that was merely negli-
gent. 53 In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 54 the Court insisted
46. Compare White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974) (negligence is actionable) with
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.) (scienter must be
shown), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). Compare Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) (privity is not required to maintain a 10b-5 action)
with Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976) (suggests that privity is still an essential
element), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). Compare Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d at 517 (reliance is still a necessary element), with Shapiro, supra,
at 239-40 (reliance need not be shown).
47. See notes 51-53 and accompanying text infra.
48. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text infra. The Supreme Court's decision in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), followed active debate by courts and
commentators over the continued viability of the requirement that the plaintiffs be actual pur-
chasers or sellers of securities in order to contest violations of rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Eason v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973) (express rejection of the
purchaser-seller rule); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) (the
injunction exception to the purchaser-seller rule); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir.) (the forced seller exception), cert. denied,, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Froelich & Spiegel,
Standing of Federal Securities Plaintiffs-Which Way the Trend, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 510
(1975); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 W.
VA. L. REV. 268 (1968).
49. In TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), the Court adopted a test
for materiality under the proxy rules. It found facts to be material if a reasonable shareholder
would consider them important in making an investment decision. Id. at 449. The Court
seemed to suggest that this standard would also apply to 10b-5 cases by citing, without distinc-
tion, materiality cases construing various securities provisions, including rule 10b-5. Id. at
445-46 n.8. The Court also distinguished the decision in Affiliated Ute, a 10b-5 case. Id. at 447
n.9.
This formula is a stronger requirement than an earlier definition of materiality, that which an
investor "might" consider important, accepted by many lower courts. See, e.g., Chasins v.
Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
50. See generally Marinelli, Limitations on Rule 10b-5, 80 W. VA. L. REV. 219 (1978);
Whitaker & Rotch, The Supreme Court and the Counter-Revolution in Securities Regulation, 30
ALA. L. REV. 335 (1979); Note, Judicial Retrenchment under Rule 10b-5: An End to the Rule as
Law?, 1976 DUKE L.J. 789.
51. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
52. Id. at 193.
53. Id. at 214. Many lower courts held, prior to the Hochfelder decision, that intent to
injure was unnecessary for 10b-5 liability. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d at 729, 734 ;
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873
(1974). Some courts held that negligent conduct was sufficient. Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills,
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
that only actual purchasers or sellers may recover under rule 10b-5 55 and
denied liability to persons who did not purchase because of the alleged mis-
representation. 56
Consequently, the liberal decision in Zweig v. Hearst Corporation is con-
trary to the current trend advanced by these restrictive opinions of the Su-
preme Court. The Zweig court asserted that its decision is "fully consistent
with the spirit and letter of the securities laws." 5 7  Such justification may
have sufficed in earlier days when an expansive interpretation of rule 10b-5
was the norm. 58 Given the current reevaluation and retrenchment of the
Supreme Court, together with the Court's demand that some elements of
the 10b-5 action remain sacrosanct, the Ninth Circuit's decision must be
viewed skeptically since it was the product of a questionable interpretation
of the elements of a 10b-5 cause of action.
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant col-
umnist could be liable for the losses sustained in the merger transaction due
to the appearance of the column and the attendant rise in the market value
of the ASI stock. 59  Reversing the grant of dismissal, 60 the appellate court
Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1972); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 229-30
& n.9 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). While the Supreme Court rejected negli-
gence as the appropriate standard of conduct for 10b-5 liability, the Court left open the question
of whether recklessness suffices. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
54. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
55. Id. The Court embraced the purchaser-seller doctrine first announced in Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), holding that a
plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities to maintain an action under rule 10b-5. Id. at
464.
56. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The plaintiff in Blue Chips was a retailer which had been offered
the securities of Blue Chip Stamps under the latter's antitrust consent decree. The plaintiff did
not purchase the securities and claimed that it had forgone purchase based on an unduly pes-
simistic prospectus. Id.
57. 594 F.2d at 1270.
58. See notes 25-33 and accompanying text supra.
59. 594 F.2d at 1271.
60. Id. The court applied the summary- judgment standard as the scope of review of this
dismissal order because it felt the motion to dismiss actually "functioned" as a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Id. at 1263-64. The court based this decision on its reading of the lower court
transcript, finding the parties "did not expect the judge to try the facts" but rather "intended
the motion to dismiss to test the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' claim." Id. at 1263. The
court's posture was apparently influenced by a variety of factors. The trial court characterized its
action as viewing the evidence "in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs", a summary judgment
standard. Id. at 1263-64 & n.2. The appellate court also held that some of the lower court's
findings of fact were inappropriate since "there was ample evidence to the contrary in plaintiffs'
offer of proof." id. at 1264 n.3. Finally, the court viewed with displeasure the fact that the
findings of fact and conclusions of law were drafted by the plaintiff's attorneys and not the court
and therefore "... . scrutinize[d] them more carefully." Id. at 1264 n.2.
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found that Campbell's failure to disclose his activities in connection with the
ASI stock was a violation of rule 10b-5. 61
To ascertain whether the defendant's conduct was a 10b-5 violation, the
court first inquired whether the necessary element of materiality was pres-
ent. 62 The concept of materiality is fundamental to the scheme of the se-
curities laws, 63 and courts usually assess the materiality of an omission or a
misrepresentation under rule 10b-5 by using the same criteria that is
employed under other provisions of the securities laws. 64 In like manner,
the Ninth Circuit applied a standard for materiality that was recently formu-
lated by the Supreme Court in a proxy violation case. 65  The majority found
that investors would have considered the defendant's lack of objectivity66
and his motivations 67 important in making investment decisions regarding
companies praised in the column. 68 The court was influenced by the nature
of the column, finding its style, tone, and approval of investment in ASI
grounds for holding the nondisclosure of his stock ownership material to the
readers' evaluation of the column's objectivity. 69
After determining that the defendant's nondisclosure of stock ownership
was material to the readers and presuming his intent to profit, 70 the court
61. 594 F.2d at 1271. The court remanded for determination of whether the requisite intent
could be shown. Id. The appellate court did presume an intent to profit in order to aid in its
analysis. Id. at 1265. The court also remanded for trial court evaluation the measure of
damages. Id. at 1268 n. 12. The court indicates that the measure of damages should be limited
to the difference between the value that would have been paid in the merger had Campbell
revealed the material facts in his column and the value that actually was paid. Id. This formula
recognizes the possibility that even a column disclosing all facts could have caused an elevation
of the price of the stock, a loss the plaintiffs would have to absorb.
62. 594 F.2d at 1266.
63. Many of the antifraud and disclosure provisions of the securities laws employ the con-
cept of materiality in defining their proscriptions. See Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k (1976); § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976); § 17(a) (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1976).
64. See, e.g., Republic Technology Fund, Inc. v. Lionel Corp., 483 F.2d 540, 551 (2d Cir.
1973) (same test for 10b-5, § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, and § 14(e) of the 1934 Act), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 918 (1974); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 355 (10th Cir. 1970) (§ 12(2) of the 1933
Act and 10b-5 cases use 10b-5 authority for materiality); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 174
(3d Cir.) (§ 14(a) of the 1934 Act case is good authority for 10b-5), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950
(1970).
65. 594 F.2d at 1266, applying the standard articulated in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). See note 49 supra. For other cases applying the TSC formula to
10b-5 cases, see Joyce v. Joyce Beverage, Inc., 571 F.2d 703, 707 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 905 (1978); Goldberg v. Meddor, 567 F.2d 209, 218 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1069 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
66. 594 F.2d at 1266.
67. Id. The court cited Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), where
the Supreme Court implied that motivations were material. Id. at 152.
68. 594 F.2d at 1266.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1265.
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turned its attention to the issue of the defendant's duty to disclose. 7' The
majority implied that only the elements of materiality and duty to disclose, 72
when accompanied by scienter, 7 are required to hold a defendant liable
under rule 10b-5. This position was supported by the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Affiliated Ute. 74
Generally, the "duty to disclose" belies precise definition. Until the Af-
filiated Ute decision, it was never postulated as a distinct element of the
10b-5 cause of action. 75 Although opinions have indicated that assessing the
duty to disclose is the initial inquiry in imposing liability under rule 10b-5, 76
finding this duty has often depended upon the presence of the other tradi-
tional elements. 77 As a result, the parameters of the duty to disclose have
been explained in terms of scienter, 7 causation, 79 and materiality. 8° A
duty to disclose was generally imposed to eliminate inequity when one with
non-public information benefits by its use in trading securities. 81 This basic
philosophy supports imposing a duty whenever the other elements are
proven. Also, the very purpose of the securities laws, particularly section
10(b) and rule 10b-5, is to encourage disclosure in certain situations. There-
fore, the concept of a duty to disclose can be seen as inextricably inter-
twined with the presence of any of the other elements required in actions
under these provisions.
An earlier Ninth Circuit decision, White v. Abrams, 82 adopted a "flexible
duty" approach to 10b-5 cases, 8 3 intending that the duty to disclose replace
71. Id. at 1266.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1271. See notes 52, 53, and accompanying text supra.
74. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
75. The Affiliated Ute Court recognized the necessity of proving causation-in-fact but did
not consider proof of reliance dispositive of the causation requirement. Id. at 153-54. The Court
stated that the test for causation was the existence of the duty to disclose and the materiality of
nondisclosure. Id. at 154. Since materiality is itself a distinct element, only the other half of the
causation test, the duty to disclose, stands as the other necessary criterion for imposing 10b-5
liability. Of course, Affiliated Ute predated Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
Scienter is now an undisputed element as a result of the latter decision. See notes 51-53 and
accompanying text supra.
76. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d at 732; Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480
F.2d at 363.
77. See notes 40-45 supra.
78. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d at 363.
79. The duty to disclose does not extend to all investors in the market, rather only those
causally connected with the insiders trading are beneficiaries of the duty. Fridrich v. Bradford,
542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976).
80. The Supreme Court has suggested that the presence of the duty to disclose is predicated
on the materiality of the nondisclosure. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at
153. See also Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 408-09 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 993 (1976).
81. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912.
82. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
83. Id. at 734.
1979] ZWEIG V. HEARST CORP.
the traditional emphasis on scienter. 84 Despite the fact that proof of sci-
enter has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, 8 5 the Zweig court consid-
ered the following factors delineated in the White opinion relevant to the
determination of the duty to disclose: 86 (1) defendant's relationship to the
plaintiff; (2) defendant's access to the information as compared to that of the
plaintiff; (3) defendant's benefit derived from the relationship; (4) defendant's
awareness of whether plaintiff was relying on their relationship in making his
or her investment decisions; and (5) defendant's activity in initiating the
transaction in question. 87 The court found a clear duty to disclose to the
readers employing the above factors. 88 Campbell's status as an informal
financial advisor in a position to influence the market provided the requisite
relationship, despite the absence of fiduciary duties. 89 He controlled the
information and his salary provided a financial benefit from his relationship
with the readers. 90 Finally, the column apparently initiated many of the
purchases that caused the stock's rise in price. 91
The majority's finding of a conflict of interest inherent in Campbell pro-
moting the purchase of ASI stock, even though his presumed intent was a
quick sale, exacerbated the need for a duty to disclose. 92 The court relied
on the Affiliated Ute decision, 93 suggesting that Campbell's activities were
analogous to the "market making" that demanded disclosure in that case. 94
The majority recognized that most disclosure cases involve a corporate in-
sider or a tippee receiving and acting upon information concerning the in-
herent value of the firm. 95 Although the "market information", 96 the fact
84. Id.
85. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
86. 594 F.2d at 1268. Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Control Metals Corp., 566 F.2d 631,
636 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977), supports the conclusion that the White duty analysis is still good law,
despite those parts that have been overruled. For other cases applying the White analysis, see
Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc., 534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896
(1976); Robinson v. Cupples Container Co., 513 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1975); Marx v. Computer
Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974).
87. 594 F.2d at 1268.
88. Id. at 1269.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. This is only an assumption on the court's part, based upon the plaintiffs' offer of
proof. Id.
92. Id. at 1268.
93. Id.
94. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 153. See also Chasins v. Smith,
Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
95. 594 F.2d at 1266.
96. "Market information" has been defined as "information about events or circumstances
which affect the market for a company's securities but which do not affect the company's assets
or earning power." Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility
to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 799 (1973), includes an analysis of
Campbell's activity based upon the SEC action taken against him. Id. at 828-35. The language
of both § 10(b) and rule lob-5 refer only to "material" information. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
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that the column was less than objective and would be used for later adver-
tisement, was considered novel, the court still found that withholding such
information was a basis for 10b-5 liability. 97
Having found a duty to the readers of the column, the court turned to an
analysis of the duty to the plaintiffs. 98 The Ninth Circuit recognized the
conceptual difficulty in finding a duty to plaintiffs who did not read the col-
umn prior to the merger decision. 99 It refused, however, to let the "rubrics
of reliance or duty" preclude its extension of the duty to disclose in this
unusual situation. 100 In essence, the court based the duty to disclose upon
the fact that, despite not having relied on the column in making their deci-
sion to invest, the plaintiffs suffered a loss due to the column's misrepresen-
tation of objectivity. 101 To support its rationale, the majority pointed out
that the plaintiffs and RGC10 2 agreed to the merger on the assumption the
exchange would be consummated in accordance with the dictates of a fully
informed market, 103 and Campbell's activities precluded the existence of
such a market. 104
The elementary philosophy underlying the securities laws is to insure a
fully informed marketplace. 105 Rectifying infractions that frustrate this pur-
pose is the primary role of rule 10b-5. 106 The operative definition of a fully
informed market is one whose participants possess relatively equal access to
information. 107 Given the Affiliated Ute precedent, 108 some notable deci-
sions have protected any and all purchasers in the open market from non-
disclosure, 10 9 because these persons are deprived of the benefit of equal
access to information. 110 Because the fact the column was published while
its author was in possession of the stock was unknown to the purchasers in
the market, the equal access test was not met. Therefore, the Zweig court's
objection to the price rise following publication of Campbell's column
Therefore, there may be no reason to differentiate between corporate information and market
information when imposing liability under these provisions.
97. 594 F.2d at 1271.
98. Id. at 1269.
99. Id. at 1270.
100. Id. at 1271.
101. Id. at 1269-71.
102. Id. at 1269.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1270.
105. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934).
106. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848, 851-52; Faberge, Inc., SEC 1934 Act
Release No. 10,174 (May 25, 1973) 1 SEC Docket, No. 18, at 23. See also Herpich v. Wallace,
430 F.2d at 801, 806, 808.
107. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849, 852.
108. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
109. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976);
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
110. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d at 236-40.
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adheres to the open market protection recently afforded under rule 10b-5
and complies with the basic purp6ses of the securities laws. 1 '
CRITICISM OF THE DECISION
The Zweig decision is novel in that it contemplates liability for damages
against a new class of market participants. The legitimacy of this extension,
however, is undermined when the court's dubious conclusions as to the duty
to disclose and the materiality of the nondisclosure to these plaintiffs are
scrutinized. In addition, the Ninth Circuit's failure to conform its decision to
the existing law outlining the "in connection with" requirement and the con-
cept of positive non-reliance provides further grounds for criticizing the
Zweig decision and its treatment of the elements necessary in a private cause
of action under rule 10b-5.
"Quasi-Insider" Liability
One aspect of the Zweig decision presenting a significant departure from
the current law of rule 10b-5 is the extension of liability for nondisclosure to
one who was neither an insider nor a tippee 112 but was actually the inde-
pendent creator of the information. Campbell was characterized as a "quasi-
insider". 113 This is the first case to impose civil liability on a person in the
defendant's position, 114 one bereft of any fiduciary duties. 115 Aside from
111. 594 F.2d at 1270. The Congressional attitude towards interference with the price
mechanism is evident in the earliest legislative history of the securities acts. The drafters stated:
The concept of a free and open market for securities necessarily implies that the
buyer and seller are acting in the exercise of enlightened judgment as to what
constitutes a fair price. Insofar as the judgment is warped by false, inaccurate, or
incomplete information regarding the corporation, the market price fails to reflect
the normal operation of the law of supply and demand.
S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934).
112. An insider is a person who: (1) possesses inside information, (2) knows or should know
the information is non-public, and (3) received the information in his business capacity by virtue
of a relationship enabling access to the information. 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5,
§ 66.02(a), at 3-281 (1975) [hereinafter cited as JACOBS]. See also Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. at 912; 1 A. BROMBERC, SECsU'rsEs LAw: FAUD-SEC RULE 10b-5, § 4.4, at 76
n.33.1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERI]. Tippees are persons given inside information by
insiders in other than their business capacity. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp. 340
(D.C. Tex. 1968) (person who has access through insider to information that should be used
only for corporate purposes and not for the personal benefit of anyone), aff'd, 412 F.2d 700 (5th
Cir. 1969); Bromberg, Corporate Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Implications, 22 Sw.
L.J. 731 (1968).
113. 594 F.2d at 1267 n.9. The court defined "quasi-insiders" as "people who obtain nonpub-
lic information from a source outside a corporation about events or circumstances which will
affect the market in the corporation's stock." Id.
114. Neither "outsiders" nor "quasi-insiders" have been held civilly liable. Outsiders have
been held criminally liable under the securities acts. U.S. v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976). Quasi-insiders have also been held criminally liable. U.S. v.
Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 441 U.S. 942 (1979); U.S. v. Peltz, 433
19791
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the Supreme Court's apparent intent to limit the scope of liability under rule
10b-5,11 6 there is no judicial statement that a person in the defendant's posi-
tion should not be subject to liability for damages. 117 In fact, the language
of rule 10b-5 permits imposing liability upon "any person". 1 18
Examination of the Ninth Circuit's analysis of Campbell's duty to his read-
ers and of the materiality of the nondisclosure suggest that imposing liability
upon a person in Campbell's position is proper despite the hint of disap-
proval emanating from the Supreme Court's recent restrictive opinions. If
the plaintiffs were readers of the column who relied upon its favorable pre-
sentation of the investment possibilities of ASI in purchasing stock, the
court's analysis would present compelling reasons for imposing liability upon
a financial columnist who abused the relationship with his readers with an
intent to profit.
The Ninth Circuit, however, is asserting liability against a columnist in
favor of plaintiffs who were parties to a merger agreement predating the
column by over three months. Breach of the duty to disclose to these plain-
tiffs was inadequately supported when compared to the majority's persuasive
determination of the duty to disclose and the materiality of the nondisclosure
to the readers. Consequently, the very factors that sustain the columnist's
liablity appear less credible when the actual outcome of the entire decision
is considered.
Duty to Plaintiffs Who Did Not Read the Column Prior to Investing
While the court insisted that materiality and the duty to disclose are dis-
positive, 119 its analysis of both these elements in relation to the plaintiffs
who took part in the merger agreement did not support the majority's con-
clusion. Conspicuously absent from the determination of a duty to disclose is
any mention of the White v. Abrams decision. While the Zweig court em-
braced the factors enumerated in that opinion as dispositive of the defend-
ant's duty to disclose to his readers, 120 it failed to reconsider those same
F.2d 48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1970). Quasi-insiders have also been liable in
SEC injunctive actions. See note 6 supra; SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-75] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Blyth & Co., Inc., 43 S.E.C. 1037 (1969).
115. The decision in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963),
imposing liability on a financial adviser for scalping stock under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § § 80b-1 et seq. (1976), focused upon the fiduciary duties of the adviser that
were breached. Id. at 194. In Zweig, the court refused to recognize the Capital Gains prece-
dent as controlling. 594 F.2d at 1267-68 & no. 10, 11. The Zweig court explicitly stated that
Campbell had no fiduciary duty to his readers. Id. at 1269.
116. See notes 47-56 and accompanying text supra.
117. The Supreme Court, however, has granted certiorari in U.S. v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d
1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2158 (1979). Perhaps some guidance will be forth-
coming from the high court on the propriety of imposing liability on persons outside the corpo-
ration.
118. See note 3 supra.
119. 594 F.2d at 1266.
120. See notes 86, 87, and accompanying text supra.
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factors in assessing the duty to these plaintiffs. In fact, the last two factors
enumerated in White 121 would deny the finding of such a duty. First, it was
impossible for Campbell to have been aware of the plaintiffs' reliance on
their relationship in making the investment decision since the plaintiffs made
their decision long before the column was contemplated. 122 The final factor
is also contrary to the finding of a duty since the time sequence obviously
prevented the column from playing a part in initiating the merger transac-
tion. 123
Two other factors outlined in White, the relationship between the par-
ties' 2 4 and the benefit derived from the relationship, 125 are also apparently
lacking in this situation. While Campbell relied upon his relationship with
the readers to provide his salary, he had no pecuniary interest in connection
with these plaintiffs. 126 The court found the requisite relationship in the
readers' dependence on the column for their investment advice, 127 but the
plaintiffs did not look to the column in making their decision to invest, pre-
cluding a direct analogy to the readers' relationship. Because Campbell con-
tinued to have sole access to the pertinent market information, this factor
remains intact in both situations.1 28
While the Ninth Circuit in White recognized the dangers in enumerating
these factors 129 for fear the list would be incomplete, 130 failure to satisfy
four of the five factors considered important by that court and reaffirmed in
an earlier part of the Zweig decision surely illustrates the tenuous grounds
upon which the majority imposed a duty to the plaintiffs who participated in
the preexisting merger. Of course, the conclusion is buttressed by the
court's own intimation that the rubrics of duty would support a contrary
decision. 131
Materiality to the Plaintiffs
It should be noted that the court did not refer to the materiality of the
defendant's nondisclosure as it related to these plaintiffs. Rather, the major-
ity only spoke of the materiality to the readers of the column. 132 The stan-
121. 495 F.2d at 735-36. See text at note 87 supra.
122. A column on ASI was recommended to Campbell in "either late May or in early June."
Appellant's Opening Brief at 6-7. The merger agreement was executed in February. 594 F.2d at
1265.
123. See note 122 supra.
124. 495 F.2d at 735-36. See text at note 87 supra.
125. Id.
126. See text at note 90 supra.
127. See text at note 89 supra.
128. See text at note 87 supra.
129. 495 F.2d at 736.
130. Id. at 735.
131. 594 F.2d at 1271.
132. Id. at 1266.
1979]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
dard for materiality is whether a reasonable investor would consider the fact
important in making his or her investment decision. 133 Since the appellate
court was considering an investment decision made more than three months
prior to the appearance of the misleading column, perhaps its silence on this
issue is understandable. It is impossible to conceive how information that
was nonexistent at the time of the investment decision could be important,
and therefore material, to these plaintiffs.
When faced with a situation similar to Zweig, where plaintiffs are contrac-
tually bound to sell their stock, other circuits invariably deny liability for any
act subsequent to the date the plaintiffs undertook their obligations because
these activities are immaterial or irrelevant to the plaintiffs' investment deci-
sions. 134 By failing to address the materiality of the nondisclosure to these
plaintiffs, the majority decision in Zweig provides no insight into why de-
fendant's activities in connection with his column should be considered
material.
Consequently, the analytical omissions in the Zweig decision make it an
imperfect vehicle for extending civil liability to a defendant who is not an
insider or a tippee. While the duty to disclose the columnist's position as a
scalper of the ASI stock to his readers is adequately explained, extension of
that duty to plaintiffs who participated in a preexisting merger is the result
of a dubious interpretation of existing law. In light of the Supreme Court's
unenthusiastic response to the proliferation of 1Ob-5 actions, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's expansive and open-ended conception of 10b-5 liability should be
viewed as inimical to the position evinced in recent Supreme Court opin-
ions.
The "In Connection With" Requirement
The language of both section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 require that a violation
actionable under these provisons be "in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities." 135 While mergers are generally recognized as providing a
basis for standing, 136 the "in connection with" language demands a nexus, 137
133. Id. See note 49 supra.
134. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d at
1049-51; Ryan v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 453 F.2d 444, 447 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 907 (1972); Ketchum v. Green, 415 F. Supp. 1367, 1371-72 (W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 557
F.2d 1022, 1028-29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977).
135. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
136. See, e.g., Knauff v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 408 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 831 (1969); Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 159-61 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 266 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
137. Williams v. Sinclair, 529 F.2d 1383, 1389 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936
(1976); Raschio v. Sinclair, 486 F.2d 1029, 1030 (9th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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usually expressed in temporal terms, 138 between the fraud and the purchase
or sale. Use of the "in connection with" language "intended only that the
device employed ...would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and,
in connection therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a corpo-
ration's securities."' 1 39  Therefore, the general rule is that fraud must pre-
cede or be contemporaneous with the purchase or sale to provide the requi-
site nexus. 140 An exception to this rule was developed in cases involving a
continuous fraudulent scheme. 141
In other contexts under rule 10b-5, the point in time when the parties are
"committed", not the later closing date, is dispositive of the issue of when a
purchase or sale occurs. 142 In Zweig, the court acknowledged that the
plaintiffs were contractually committed prior to the publication of the col-
umn. 143 Therefore, if the point of commitment is determinative, the facts
in this case indicate the purchase occurred prior to the column's appearance.
Consequently, the purchase preceded the fraud, and since this is not a case
of a continuous fraudulent scheme, 144 the general rule that a fraud sub-
sequent to the transaction lacks the requisite nexus to satisfy the "in connec-
tion with" requirement would deny these plaintiffs standing. 145
138. '[T]here was an unbroken chain ... linking together defendant's alleged fraud, the
stock transaction and plaintiffs' loss." Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 435 (10th Cir. 1973);
Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 842 (D.N.J. 1972).
139. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 860.
140. "Quite obviously, the 'fraud' must be in connection with the purchase or sale of a se-
curity. No case has been called to our attention which has sustained federal jurisdiction under
10(b) for a fraud committed or practiced after a purchase or sale." Pepsico, Inc. v. W.R. Grace
& Co., 307 F. Supp. 713, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also Raschio v. Sinclair, 486 F.2d 1029 (9th
Cir. 1973); Horst v. W.T. Cabe & Co., Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,461
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see Lanning v. Serwold, 474 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1973) (no rule that fraud
must precede the sale).
141. Davis v. Davis, 526 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1976); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489
F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Lanning v. Serwold, 474 F.2d 716 (9th
Cir. 1973).
142. Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d at 890-91 ("commitment" when par-
ties have a meeting of the minds-"it marks the point at which the parties obligated themselves
to perform what they had agreed to perform even if the formal performance of their agreement
is to be after a lapse of time"). See also Pittsburgh Coke & Chem. Co. v. Bollo, 421 F. Supp.
908, 923 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 353 F. Supp. 795, 801-02 (W.D. Pa.
1973). But see Schine v. Schine, 250 F. Supp. 822, 824-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). "[T]he time [plain-
tiff] places an order, rather than the time of its ultimate execution, [is] determinative for Rule
10b-5 purposes." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 853 n.17. See also Ryan v. J.
Walter Thompson Co., 453 F.2d 444, 447 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 907 (1972);
Fershtman v. Schectman, 450 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066
(1972).
143. 594 F.2d at 1265.
144. This cannot possibly be a "continuous scheme" case since Campbell, the party to the
fraud in question, had no relation whatever to the formulation or adoption of the merger
agreement (even assuming the possibility that the latter was procured through fraudulent
means, an assumption for which there is no evidence in the opinion).
145. The dissenting judge felt "the majority effectively removed the substantive content in
the requirement of 'in connection with . . .' " 594 F.2d at 1272 (Ely, J., dissenting). The majori-
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The court did not directly address the standing issue in its decision. It
did, however, characterize the plaintiffs' position as subject to an "execu-
tory" agreement. 146 Recently, a line of cases have held that fraud commit-
ted during the pendency of an executory contract is actionable under rule
10b-5. 147 These cases, although adopting the general rule that the fraud
must precede or be contemporaneous with the purchase or sale to be action-
able, reasoned that the defrauded plaintiffs had standing to bring suit despite
the fact the purchase or sale actually preceded the fraud. 148 In Horst v.
W.T. Cabe & Co., 149 the court stated that this exception to the general rule
stems from the courts' refusal to allow individuals to take advantage of their
contractual relationship in committing fraud upon others. 150
If the Zweig majority relied upon the executory contract exception, the
court inappropriately applied it to the present fact situation because
Campbell was not a party to the original merger and, thus, was not taking
advantage of any contractual position. In fact, the court pointed out that
Campbell may have been unaware of the merger's existence. 151 As a result,
it can only be postulated that the majority is extending the executory con-
tract doctrine beyond the parameters imposed by earlier decisions. 152 Ab-
sent a valid application of the executory contract doctrine, the decision can
be criticized for its failure to indicate how the fraud was "in connection
with" the purchase or sale of securities, as that element of the private 10b-5
cause of action has been construed.
ty's silence on the "in connection with" issue implies that they are treating June 10, the transfer
date, as the point of purchase and not the earlier date when the plaintiffs made their decision to
invest (the February date when the merger agreement was adopted). Selection of this date as
the purchase which the fraud was "in connection with" presents "nexus" problems the dissent-
ing judge is apparently alluding to. See notes 137-145 supra. But there is authority for treating
the date of conversion of stock under a merger agreement as the point of purchase. Smallwood
v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 591 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). The
Smallwood case, however, can be distinguished from the situation in Zweig since the former
does not present the same nexus problems. In Smallwood, the plaintiff was contesting misrep-
resentations made in the proxy solicitations that induced the plaintiff and his fellow shareholders
to agree to the merger. Id. at 586-89. Therefore, the fraud induced the purchase or sale, thus
complying with the traditional construction of the "in connection with" requirement. See notes
137-140 supra.
146. 594 F.2d at 1265.
147. Ohashi v. Verit Indus., 536 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1976); Davis v. Davis, 526 F.2d 1286 (5th
Cir. 1976) (only seeking injunctive relief, therefore not as strict in seeking specific compliance
with the standing rules); Horst v. W.T. Cabe & Co., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at
92,461 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
148. See note 147 supra.
149. FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,461 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
150. Id. at 92,466. Therefore, this exception appears to be simply a variation of the continu-
ous fraudulent scheme exception. See note 141 supra.
151. 594 F.2d at 1265, 1269.
152. It should be noted that the decision in Ohashi v. Verit Indus., 536 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.
1976), was from the Ninth Circuit. Therefore, if the court was extending this doctrine it would
be reasonable to presume they would cite their own authority. This case, however, was not
cited anywhere in the opinion.
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The Reliance Requirement
The final critique of this decision concerns assertion of liability against a
defendant despite affirmative evidence that the plaintiffs did not rely upon
the column in making their decision to invest. The Ninth Circuit failed to
discuss the implications of this position when proof of the requisite causation
element was considered.
Until the Supreme Court decision in Affiliated Ute, 153 proof of reliance
upon the fraudulent conduct in making investment decisions was required in
order to recover in a private cause of action for damages. 154 Although the
Court stated that a plaintiff need not prove reliance in a nondisclosure
case, 155 causation still must be proven. 156 The Supreme Court also stated
that the test for causation is the presence of materiality and the duty to
disclose, 157 thereby replacing reliance as the traditional test for causa-
tion. 158 Reliance had been a prerequisite "to restrict the potentially limit-
less thrust of Rule 10b-5 to those situations in which there exists a causation
in fact between the act and the injury." 159
Since the decision in Affiliated Ute, the lower courts have debated the
necessity for proof of reliance. 160 These courts have construed the Supreme
Court's holding as establishing a "presumption" of reliance, 161 allowing the
defendant an opportunity to rebut with positive proof of non-reliance. 162
The implication of this rebuttable presumption was succinctly stated by one
circuit, holding that if the plaintiff's decision regarding the transaction would
not have differed had the disclosure been made, causation cannot be
shown. 163 Therefore, positive proof of non-reliance precludes a finding of
153. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
154. Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggan, 513 F.2d at 238-39; Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.,
418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
155. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 153.
156. Id. at 154.
157. Id.
158. See cases cited in footnote 154 supra.
159. Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggan, 513 F.2d at 238-39.
160. See, e.g., Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d at 410 (allows positive proof of non-
reliance despite Affiliated Ute); Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482
F.2d at 883-85 (limits Affiliated Ute in an omission case); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.) (demanded reliance, no mention of Af-
filiated Ute), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
161. See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d at 1048; Chelsea Assoc. v.
Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271 (6th Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir.
1974).
162. See cases cited in footnote 161 supra. See also St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925
(1978); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d at 906; Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 482 F.2d at 884.
163. In Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), the court stated:
If defendant is able to demonstrate that there was clearly no reliance, that is, that
even if the material facts had been disclosed, plaintiff's decision as to the transac-
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causation in circuits adopting this position 1 6 despite the Supreme Court's
formulation of a "new" test for causation. 165 The Zweig decision marks the
Ninth Circuit's departure from this rebuttable presumption approach. 166
Regarding plaintiffs who are contractually committed to a purchase or sale,
decisions in other circuits have denied liability for actions subsequent to the
decision to invest. Non-reliance was usually evidenced by the prior contract,
precluding any finding of causation. 167 Since the plaintiffs in the instant
action also were contractually committed prior to the fraud, the Zweig major-
ity's unprecedented approach to reliance and causation is inconsistent with
past Ninth Circuit decisions.' 68 By preserving a cause of action for plaintiffs
who made their decision to invest months prior to the publication of the
fraudulent column, the Zweig decision focuses on the defendant's actions as
the sole cause of the plaintiff's losses. 169 This decision, however, surpasses
other opinions allowing recovery based upon loss causation alone 170 as these
decisions did not completely eliminate the vestiges of reliance. 171
The Zweig majority embraced, without comment, the Affiliated Ute hold-
ing that materiality establishes causation. 172  The Ninth Circuit, however,
stretched that analysis, reaching a result unforeseen by the Supreme Court
tion would not have been different from what it was, then the non-disclosure cannot
be said to have caused the subsequent loss and under the ordinary principles of the
law of fraud, recovery should be denied.
Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
164. See cases cited in footnote 162 supra.
165. See note 157 and accompanying text supra.
166. Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Control Metals Corp., 566 F.2d at 636 n.3; Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d at 906.
167. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d at
1049-51; Ryan v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 453 F.2d at 447; Ketchum v. Green, 415 F. Supp.
1367, 1371-72 (W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d 1022, 1028-29 (3 Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
940 (1977). See also Dopp v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 461 F.2d 873, 880 n.16 (2d Cir. 1972);
Fershtman v. Schectman, 450 F.2d at 1360; Bank v. Fleisher, 419 F. Supp. 1243, 1248-49, 1251
(D. Neb. 1976).
168. See note 166 and accompanying text supra.
169. See notes 101-04 and accompanying text supra.
170. In Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 976 (1976), the Second Circuit suggested a bifurcated approach to the requirement that
causation be shown in a 10b-5 action. The court required a showing of both "loss causation",
that the omission caused the economic harm (id. at 380) and "transaction causation", that the
violation caused the plaintiff to enter the transaction in question (id.). The latter is more com-
monly referred to as "reliance". Id. at n. 11. To accommodate the decision in Affiliated Ute, the
Schlick court held that a plaintiff need only show materiality in a nondisclosure case and not
traditional reliance. Id. at 380-81. See also BROMBERG, supra note 112, § 8.6, at 209-11.
171. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d at 908 & n.23 (although presumes reliance of
purchases in the open market, does not dispense with need for a "transactional nexus"); Shapiro
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d at 236-40 (limits recovery to those
who purchase during the period of nondisclosure); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper-Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d at 375 (presume reliance "where it is logical" to do so).
172. 594 F.2d at 1271.
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when it abolished the necessity for proof of reliance to a successful showing
of causation. 173 Since the Supreme Court was not addressing a preexisting
agreement situation in Affiliated Ute, there is some doubt, particularly in
light of its recent conservative approach to the 10b-5 elements, whether the
Court would approve this extension of its analysis. 174 In addition, the other
circuits have responded by denying recovery to plaintiffs in similar situa-
tions. 175 Justice Blackmun, author of the majority opinion in Affiliated Ute,
described the Court's holding in a later concurring opinion 1 76 as "simply
provid[ing] the causal link between the omission of material information and
the shareholder's act of purchasing or selling the stock."1 77 This account of
the decision implies that the Supreme Court was considering only the nor-
mal progression of a fraud inducing the latter purchase or sale. Therefore,
the Zweig majority's dependence upon this case to mask its dubious causa-
tion analysis is probably misplaced and to some extent misleading.
POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ZwEIG DECISION
As indicated, the Zweig opinion does not present any authority for its
treatment of the standing and causation issues. In addition, the opinion does
not resolve the apparent problems that arise from a strict analysis of these
10b-5 elements. The court, however, is dealing with a triangular fraud situa-
tion.178 Fraud to the readers of the column resulted in a loss to the plain-
tiffs upon consummation of their merger. A comparison to other triangular
fraud decisions and their resolution of the standing and causation issues
suggests an alternative method of viewing the Zweig decision and a possible
justification for the court's refusal to allow a strict evaluation of the elements
to impede liability.
Plaintiffs in analogous positions have been successful in two Second Circuit
decisions, 179 cited as authority for the so-called "forced seller" exception to
173. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
174. The Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), suggested
that the harm to the investors should not be the focal point in imposing liability under § 10(b)
in its decision to require scienter for actions under that provision. Id. at 198. Therefore, a
decision focusing upon the economic loss to the plaintiff, as the Zweig decision does, would
certainly appear to conflict with current Supreme Court attitudes towards 10b-5 liability.
175. See cases cited in footnote 167 supra.
176. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 51 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
178. A triangular fraud is a fraud practiced by A upon B resulting in harm to C.
179. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 822 (1970); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1967). See also Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973), another triangular fraud case, decided under § 14(e) of
the Williams Act regulating tender offers. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). This decision employs the
analysis of the Vine and Crane decisions.
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the standing requirements of the purchaser-seller rule. 180 In Vine v. Bene-
ficial Finance Co., 181 the plaintiff sought to use rule 10b-5 to attack fraud in
a tender offer to his fellow shareholders that enabled the defendant to con-
summate a short-form merger with the plaintiff under Delaware law. 182
The Second Circuit characterized the plaintiff as a "forced seller" as a result
of the fraud and granted standing to sue. 183
The decision in Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. 184 awarded
forced seller status to a defeated tender offeror. 185 The plaintiff Crane
proposed a merger with the defendant corporation to be accomplished
through its tender offer to defendant's shareholders. The plaintiff brought
suit under rule 10b-5 to contest alleged market manipulations 18 6 that misled
the shareholders, inducing them to vote against the plaintiff's tender offer
and in favor of a competing offeror. 187
Both cases recognized the rights of the plaintiff to sue for damages result-
ing from fraud directed against third party shareholders rather than the
plaintiffs themselves. Although the Zweig court did not cite these cases
as authority for its decision to grant standing to the plaintiffs, the appellate
court did characterize the plaintiffs as "forced purchasers" of the ASI stock
due to the merger agreement. 188 As such, the court may be intimating its
reliance on these "forced seller" cases to extend the 10b-5 remedy to those
plaintiffs who are contesting fraud practiced against the readers.
180. See notes 48, 54-56, and accompanying text supra. For cases applying this "'forced
seller" doctrine see Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Dudley v.
Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971);
Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973).
181. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
182. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (Supp. 1964) requires no shareholder vote to effect a merger of
this kind. A short-form merger occurs when a parent corporation, owing almost all of the stock
of the subsidiary corporation, merges with the subsidiary. Beneficial Finance acquired 95% of
the stock of the Crown Finance Co. via the allegedly fraudulent tender offer. The plaintiff was
owner of the remaining 5% interest. Beneficial was thereby able to merge Crown Finance
without the plaintiff's approval.
183. 374 F.2d at 635.
184. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
185. Id. at 797. The "forced seller" status actually arose from Crane's being forced to divest
itself of stock due to a threat of a divestiture action under the anti-trust laws. Id. at 798. Crane
was required to exchange its Westinghouse shares for American Standard stock as a result of the
eventual merger of the latter companies. Therefore, Crane was left holding a number of shares
of American Standard, its largest competitor. Id.
186. American Standard was the competing tender offeror. Acting in concert with the West-
inghouse management, id. at 796, Standard purchased 170,000 shares of Westinghouse on the
New York Stock Exchange and secretly resold 120,000 shares on an over-the-counter market,
both transactions occurring on the last day of the plaintiff's tender offer. Id. at 793.
187. These manipulations, see note 186 supra, caused the market price of Westinghouse to
rise above the price offered in the plaintiff's tender offer. As a result, the shareholders rejected
the plaintiff's offer. 419 F.2d at 797.
188. 594 F.2d at 1270.
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The formula for proof of reliance advanced by the Second Circuit also is
relevant to the decision in Zweig. If third party reliance caused the plaintiff's
injury, the Second Circuit looked to the third parties' reliance upon the de-
ception where the plaintiff is in a position that does not require an exercise
of volition. 189 Since the Zweig plaintiffs were bound by the merger agree-
ment, their "forced" purchase of the ASI stock required no further act of
volition. Market purchases of the ASI stock after the column's appearance
were presumed to be in reliance upon the column. 190 This presumption
apparently is based upon the earlier Ninth Circuit decision of Blackie v. Bar-
rack, 191 holding that during the period of nondisclosure, traders need not
prove direct reliance upon the activities of the defendant. Finally, since the
readers' purchase of stock upon the recommendation of Campbell's mislead-
ing column was presumed to have caused both the quick rise in price 192 and
dilution of the plaintiffs' interest in the merged corporation, 193 causation is
adequately proven despite plaintiffs' actual non-reliance.
While the Ninth Circuit's approach in Zweig closely parallels the rationale
of the forced seller cases, it should be noted that these decisions were a
product of the earlier liberal approach to 10b-5 liability. The current attitude
of the Supreme Court, particularly its distaste for case-by-case erosion of the
purchaser-seller requirement, 194 has cast their present viability in doubt, a
doubt certainly heightened by the appellate court's failure to cite this strong
authority from its sister circuit to support extenuation of the elements. 195
189. The Second Circuit states:
We have held that where the success of the fraud does not require an exercise of
volition by the plaintiff, but instead requires an exercise of volition by other per-
sons, there need be no showing that the plaintiff himself relied upon the deception.
What must be shown is that there was deception which misled other stockholders
and that was in fact the cause of plaintiff's claimed injury.
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d at 797, citing Vine v. Beneficial Finance
Corp., 374 F.2d at 635.
190. 594 F.2d at 1271.
191. 524 F.2d at 906. See also Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495
F.2d at 237-38; Reeder v. Mastercraft Electronics Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); BROMBERG, supra note 112, § 8.6, at 212 (a person who trades during the period in
question may be harmed by a deception that affects prices and conditions in the market, regard-
less of whether he has relied on or ever heard of the deception).
192. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
193. See note 17 supra.
194. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 755.
195. The failure of the Ninth Circuit court to cite authority from its sister circuit that would
have clarified the court's analysis and justfied its result is intriguing. Two distinct considerations
may have played a part in the court's reluctance to cite this authority. First, the defendants in
both Crane and Vine were held liable for manipulations designed to intentionally injure the
third-party plaintiffs. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d at 798; Vine v.
Benenficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d at 635. In Zweig, however, the court acknowledged the fact
that the merger plan was "perhaps unknown to Campbell". 594 F.2d at 1265. The decision does
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AN ALTERNATIVE TO 10B-5 ABROGATION
Comparison to another facet of the Crane case, 196 encouraging legislation
extending the available alternatives to courts facing a Zweig situation, is
suggested. In Crane, the 10b-5 action was based upon the defendant's non-
disclosure of manipulative activity constituting a distinct violation of the se-
curities laws under Section 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 197
Section 9(a)(2)198 is the most comprehensive of the various antimanipulative
provisions in section 9 of the Act, 199 and express civil liability for its breach
is afforded through section 9(e). 200 Section 9(a)(2 ) is limited, however, to
not suggest that Campbell was intentionally interfering with the merger's consummation.
Perhaps this distinction prevented the Ninth Circuit's citation to these decisions.
The second factor that may have precluded direct reliance on these opinions is the possibility
that this "forced seller" exception to the standing rules may no longer be viable since the
Supreme Court decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Most
commentators feel that this exception should still stand since the Court was not confronting a
"forced seller" situation. See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 112, at § 38.01(e)(iv)(C) (1975); Whitaker
& Rotch, The Supreme Court and the Counter-Revolution in Securities Regulation, 30 ALA. L.
REV. 335, 358 (1979); Note, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores: The Future of Standing
under Rule 10b-5, 61 IOWA L. REV. 497, 542-43 (1975). But the Supreme Court did indicate its
distaste for case-by-case exceptions to the purchaser-seller requirement. At least one commen-
tator agrees that the exception has doubtful viability since the Supreme Court's pronouncement.
See Gallagher, 10b-5 After Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands the Judicial Oak?, 80 DICK. L. REv.
1, 36-37 (1975). Therefore, it is possible that the viability of the "forced seller" exception has
been jeopardized by the high court. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit avoided direct reliance upon
these decisions since citing to them would probably have demanded a stand in the controversy
surrounding the exception.
196. See notes 184-187 and accompanying text supra.
197. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1976). Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
198. Section 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1976),
makes it unlawful:
To effect, alone or with one or more persons, a series of transactions in any security
registered on a national securities exchange creating actual or apparent active trad-
ing in such security or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.
199. The other provisions of § 9 proscribe specific forms of manipulation. See, e.g., § 9 (a)(1)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1) (1976), prohibiting washed sales
and matched orders to create an appearance of active trading; § 9(a)(6) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(6) (1976), allowing the Commission to prescribe rules
regulating pegging, fixing, or stabilizing the price of a security, thereby exempting those ac-
tivities from the broad proscription of § 9(a)(2).
200. Section 9(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976), provides:
Any person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in violation of subsec-
tion (a), (b), or (c) of this section, shall be liable to any person who shall purchase or
sell any security at a price which was affected by such act or transaction, and the
person so injured may sue in law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction
to recover the damages sustained as a result of any such act or transaction , . .No
action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section, unless
brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violations
and within three years after such violation.
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manipulations involving securities listed on a national securities ex-
change. 201 Manipulative activity in unlisted securities traded on the over-
the-counter market is actionable only under the general antimanipulative
language of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 20 2 It should be noted that the ASI
stock was traded only over-the-counter; 203 therefore, Campbell's activity was
not actionable under section 9(a)(2). The facts of the case and the court's
characterization of Campbell's behavior, 20 4 however, indicate that the de-
fendant's liability was based on the manipulative nature of his activities. 205
Although few plaintiffs have successfully attempted recovery for violations of
section 9(a)(2), 20 6 opting instead for the protection of rule 10b-5, 20 7 it ap-
pears that the plaintiffs in Zweig may have been able to recover under sec-
tion (9)(e) if that remedy were available to them.
The elements of a cause of action under section 9(e) are: (1) damages sus-
tained as a result of the manipulative activities; (2) purchase or sale at a price
affected by manipulative activities; and (3) willful participation by the de-
fendant in manipulative activities. 208 The plaintiffs in Zweig sustained dam-
ages due to Campbell's activities, evidenced by their loss of a greater per-
201. See note 198 supra.
202. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-I, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-1 (1978). See also
SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30
S.E.C. 106 (1949); Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 328 (1941); Edward J. Mawod & Co., Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 13,512 (May 24, 1977) 12 SEC Docket, No. 4, 363.
203. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, Appellant's Reply Brief at 3.
204. 594 F.2d at 1269-71.
205. Id.
206. The difficult requirements of proof and the security for cost and short limitations period
for the express civil action under § 9(e) have proved less appealing to the private plaintiff. Loss,
supra note 22, at 1747-51; BROMBERG, supra note 112, § 7.1, at 144-45.
The government has proceeded under § 9 more easily. See, e.g., United States v. Re, 336
F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964); United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964); United States v. Minuse, 142 F.2d 388 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 716 (1944); Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89 (2d. Cir. 1940).
207. The statute of limitations under § 9(e) bars suit brought more than three years after the
violation or more than one year after plaintiff's discovery of the violation, see note 200 supra,
whereas the statute of limitations of the forum state is applied in the implied cause of action
under § 10(b) and is often more generous than § 9(e). Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at
210 n.29; Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
For example, the applicable period in an action brought in New York is the later of 6 years after
the violation, and 2 years after the discovery of, or the time plaintiff should have discovered the
fraud. Klein v. Shields & Co., 470 F.2d 1344, 1346 (2d Cir. 1972). Some states have 6 year
limitation periods. Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1969) (Indiana); Charney v.
Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1967) (Michigan).
208. Brittin v. Schweickart, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,029, at 93,436 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
See also Kerrigan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Jewelcor Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Schneider v. Sears, 265 F.
Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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centage interest in the merger transaction. 209 This loss occurred because
the price of the stock at the merger's consummation was directly affected by
Campbell's column and his undisclosed purchase of the ASI stock. 210 On
the issue of the defendant's willful participation in the manipulative ac-
tivities, circumstantial evidence of a defendant's pecuniary interest in the
rise of the stock's price has sufficed in other decisions. 211 Therefore,
Campbell's resale of the stock at a price elevated by his laudatory column
may have provided the requisite intent under section 9(e). 212
As indicated, the Ninth Circuit either altered or ignored existing law defin-
ing the elements of the 10b-5 cause of action in holding the defendant col-
umnist liable. The court's departure from precedent in order to reach this
result arguably would not have occurred had the section 9 remedies against
manipulative conduct been available to the court, since section 9 does not
require proof of the common law elements.
In addition to the Supreme Court's traditional approach to 10b-5 recovery,
the Court has also insisted that rule 10b-5 is not a catchall for causes of
action more appropriately brought under other sections. 213 The Zweig situ-
ation illustrates the need for legislative action to accommodate both policies
motivating the Supreme Court. 214 If the plaintiffs could have proceeded
under section 9, the Ninth Circuit probably could have avoided formulating
questionable 10b-5 case law to arrive at a result the court felt was justified
by the manipulative nature of the defendant's offense.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have abrogated many of
the elements of the 10b-5 cause of action in its fervent attempt to justify the
possible liability of a columnist under these unique circumstances. Without
the benefit of precedent, the majority sidestepped or ignored the law of
10b-5 liability as it exists in other circuits as well as its own.
209. See note 17 supra.
210. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
211. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Corp., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 822 (1970); SEC v. Torr, 22 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Batterman, Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 12,278 (April 13, 1976) 9 SEC Docket, No. 6, 307.
212. See note 61 supra. Absent satisfactory explanation to the contrary, fact that person who
has purchased stock in series of transactions and thus has raised its price, and disposes of such
stock before true effect of purchases has been dissipated by other market factors, gives rise to
inference of manipulative purpose regarding such purchases. Thorton & Co., 28 S.E.C. 208
(1948), aff'd, Thorton v. SEC, 171 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1948).
213. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 210.
214. The drafters of the proposed model securities code have eliminated the restriction of the
anti-manipulative provisions to the exchange markets. ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1710
(1978 Draft). See Comments and history to § 1308 in ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE 1 1308
(2d Tentative Draft 1973).
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While it is possible to empathize with the court's distaste for the scalping
activities presented in this case, its unbridled erosion of the 10b-5 elements
conflicts with the policies underlying the Supreme Court's recent posture.
The Supreme Court did not demonstrate its displeasure with an expansive
reading of rule 10b-5 by making blanket denials of liability in all cases.
Rather, the Court has chosen to signal its retraction of the scope of liability
through reaffirmation of the traditional approaches to the elements of the
10b-5 cause of action.
Therefore, while the Supreme Court is demanding the traditional proof of
the elements, the Ninth Circuit has allowed a liberal construction of these
same elements to impose liability in this situation. As such, it is difficult to
predict the ultimate impact the Zweig decision will have on 10b-5 liability.
Perhaps the Ninth Circuit is charting its own course on a return voyage to
the days of liberal and flexible interpretation. Or perhaps the decision will
retain its current status, that of a curious anomaly that is the product of its
own egregious facts.
Kathleen A. Gallichio
STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT
AND CIRCULATION
as required by the Act of August 12, 1970
Section 3685, Title 39, United States Code
1. Title of Publication: DePaul Law Review. ISSN 0011-7188.
2. Filed: September 18, 1979.
3. Frequency of Issue: Quarterly.
A. No. of Issues Published Annually: 4
B. Annual Subscription Price: $12.00
4. Location of Known Office of Publication: DePaul University, 25 E. Jackson Blvd., Chicago,
Illinois 60604.
5. Location of the Headquarters or General Business Offices of the Publishers: DePaul Uni-
versity, 25 E. Jackson Blvd., Chicago, Illinois 60604.
6. Publisher: DePaul University, College of Law, 25 E. Jackson Blvd., Chicago, Illinois 60604.
Editor-in-Chief: Gwen Carroll, DePaul University, College of Law, 25 E. Jackson Blvd.,
Chicago, Illinois 60604.
Executive Editor: Susan Schroeder, DePaul University, College of Law, 25 E. Jackson
Blvd., Chicago, Illinois 60604.
7. Owner: DePaul University, College of Law, 25 E. Jackson Blvd., Chicago, Illinois 60604.
8. Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, and Other Security Holders Owning or Holding 1 Per-
cent or More of Total Amount of Bonds, Mortgages or Other Securities: None.
9. The Purpose, Function and Nonprofit Status of this Organization and the Exempt Status for
Federal Income Tax Purposes: Have Not Changed During Preceding 12 Months.
10. Extent and Nature of Circulation:
Average No. of Actual No. Copies of
Copies Each Single Issue Published
Issue During Nearest to
Preceding 12 Months Filing Date
A. Total No. Copies Printed: (Net Press Run) ......................... 2,200 2,300
B. Paid Circulation
1. Sales Through Dealers and
Carriers, Street Vendors
and Counter Sales ..................................................... 1,040 1,040
2. M ail Subscriptions ..................................................... 860 865
C. Total Paid Circulation
(Sum of 10B] and 10B2) ................................................. 1,900 1,905
D. Free Distribution By Mail,
Carrier or Other Means, Samples,
Complimentary, and Other Free Copies ............................ 180 263
E. Total Distribution (Sum of C and D) ................................ 2,080 2,168
F. 1. Office Use, Left Over, Unaccounted,
Spoiled After Printing ..................................................... 120 132
2. Returns from News Agents .......................................... 0 0
G. Total (Sum of E, F1 and 2-should equal
net press run shown in A) .............................................. 2,200 2,300
I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.
JAMES MARQUARDT, Business Manager
